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I. INTRODUCTION
Government corruption is a global problem that impacts both rich
and poor nations.1 Since the end of the Cold War, the transnational
consequences of corruption have become increasingly apparent for
state actors, international organizations, and civil society groups
alike. Corruption impoverishes national economies, threatens
democratic institutions, undermines the rule of law, and facilitates
threats to human rights and security through organized crime and
1. See Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Mar. 5,
2013) (defining corruption broadly as “the abuse of entrusted power for private
gain”); Glossary of Statistical Terms: Corruption, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV. (Aug. 6, 2002), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4773 (defining
corruption similarly as “active or passive misuse of the powers of Public officials
(appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits”); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining that corruption involves “a
fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or office to procure some benefit either
personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others”).
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terrorism.2 The financial costs associated with corruption are also
vast: in 2004, the World Bank estimated that both rich and poor
economies pay over $1 trillion U.S. dollars in bribes each year.3
Between 1995 and 2001, Haiti, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Peru, and the Ukraine all claimed losses ranging from
$500 million to $35 billion due to the corruption of former leaders
and senior officials.4
For resource-rich developing countries specifically, corruption
poses a particularly devastating problem due to what many scholars
have termed the “resource curse.”5 Rather than enabling socioeconomic development and fostering the entrenchment of
democracy, the endowment of natural resources regularly provides
the material basis for the misappropriation of public finances, fuels
the demand for bribery, and fosters other forms of abuse of power
and government corruption.6 Resource-rich countries generally have
lower economic growth, are less likely to be democratic, are more
likely to be corrupt, and are more prone to attempted government

2. See Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption:
Global Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 192 (2005)
(outlining the international community’s response to the increasing awareness
about the consequences of corruption).
3. The Costs of Corruption, WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004)
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2019018
7~menuPK:34457~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html
(advancing that costs of corruption have additional, indirect detriments on reducing
poverty, infant mortality, and inequality).
4. See Webb, supra note 2, at 207 (noting that economists generally agree on
the strong correlations between high levels of corruption and negative economic
consequences, including market inefficiencies, reduced levels of foreign
investment, and distorted public expenditures).
5. See, e.g., Macartan Humphreys et al., Introduction: What Is the Problem
with Natural Resource Wealth?, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 1–3 (2007)
(explaining that resource-rich exporting countries generally have lower economic
growth rates); Keith Slack, Sharing Riches of the Earth: Democratizing Natural
Resource-Led Development, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 47, 48 (2004) (discussing
how the “resource curse” undermines the comparative advantage associated with
the abundance of natural resources); James C. Owens, Governmental Failure in
Sub-Saharan Africa: The International Community’s Options, 43 VA. J. INT’L L.
1003, 1006 (2003) (advancing that grand corruption and abject governance
exacerbate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa).
6. See Humphreys et al., supra note 5, at 1–2 (noting that the international
market for resources from the developing world fuels corruption and the abuse of
power in developing states).
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coups.7
The direct connection between underdevelopment, the resource
curse, and widespread corruption raises issues pertaining to the role
of the international anti-corruption regime in addressing the problem
of “grand corruption” in the developing world.8 International anticorruption laws increasingly have been used to prosecute
corporations and individuals that bribe foreign public officials.9
These laws, however, have had limited impact on corrupt
government officials who have benefited to the detriment of the
citizenry.10 For example, the most frequently used tool to fight
international corruption, the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”), focuses entirely on the supply side of bribery and
does not create liability for foreign government officials who solicit
or accept bribes and rule by systemic corruption.11 Other anti-bribery
statutes enacted pursuant to the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
7. See id. at 1 (advancing that natural resources can prevent sustained
growth); see also Thomas Pogge, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 169
(2008) (articulating that the revenue stream from a developing country’s resource
endowment impedes democratic stability and encourages coup attempts); Xavier
Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An
Illustration from Nigeria (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 9804,
2003), available at, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804.pdf (providing an overview
of the empirical literature that posits a strong correlation between corruption and
resource-rich countries).
8. See discussion infra Part II.A (distinguishing “grand corruption” from
“corruption” by defining “grand corruption” as pervasive throughout society,
involving high-level government officials, and ultimately leading to a broad
erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule of law, and economic stability).
9. See Mike Koehler, Keeping FCPA Enforcement Statistics in Perspective,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/keeping-fcpaenforcement-statistics-in-perspective (providing an overview of corporate FCPA
enforcement data, which highlights the overall efficacy of U.S. prosecution of
foreign official bribery).
10. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times:
International Justice Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1257, 1291
(2007) (advancing the international anti-corruption regime as fundamentally
limited to the supply-side of bribery).
11. Foreign Corruption Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998); see also
United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the United
States could not use the FCPA to prosecute foreign officials for taking bribes);
Starr, supra note 10, at 1291–92 (concluding that no effective means exist to
acquire assets illicitly obtained by corrupt officials as a result of the narrow
supply-side focus).
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Transactions treat bribery in much the same manner.12 Moreover,
while the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(“UNCAC”) contains broad prohibitions on government-side
corruption, it fundamentally lacks the necessary enforcement
mechanisms to secure compliance.13 As a result, application of the
current legal regime has not effectively curtailed grand corruption
and is limited by glaring enforcement gaps.14
Still, an effective legal alternative to address the enforcement gap
may exist. As will be argued below, the crippling impact of grand
corruption in certain developing states may properly be considered a
crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”).15 This characterization would
engage Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute and allow for the
prosecution of government officials who perpetrate grand
corruption.16 In contrast to those who have arrived at a similar
12. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force
Feb.
15,
1999),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf; see also Corruption of Foreign Public
Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34 (Can.) (outlawing the bribery of foreign public
officials); Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.) (criminalizing a wide variety of briberyrelated offenses).
13. See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res.
58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC] (encouraging,
but not mandating, the criminalization of domestic corruption).
14. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 2, at 193–204, 218–22 (explaining the
shortcomings of the implementation mechanisms in the current international anticorruption regime). See generally Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a CorruptionFree Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official
Corruption to a Crime Under International Law, 34 INT’L L. 149 (2000) (calling
for the classification of grand corruption as an international economic crime).
15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
16. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 10, at 1259 (arguing, as a general matter, that
grand corruption may be classified within the category of “other inhumane acts”);
Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as an International Crime and Crime Against
Humanity: An Outline of Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 466, 474–76 (2006) (suggesting that in certain circumstances
corruption can constitute a crime against humanity); Chile Eboe-Osuji,
Kleptocracy: A Desired Subject of International Criminal Law That Is in Dire
Need of Prosecution by Universal Jurisdiction, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 132 (Evelyn A. Ankumah & Edward K.
Kwakwa eds., 2005) (arguing that the Rome Statute should be amended to include
corruption as a crime against humanity); Paul D. Ocheje, Refocusing International
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conclusion, however, this comment considers the legality of
prosecuting grand corruption under existing international criminal
jurisprudence and assesses its application to a specific factual
scenario.17 Accordingly, this comment uses the regime of former
Nigerian governor Peter Odili as a case study to assess circumstances
when grand corruption should be elevated to international criminal
status and prosecuted by the ICC. In making this argument, this
comment asserts that ICC prosecutions against the most egregious
forms of systematic government corruption, including widespread
taking of bribes, significant theft of public finances, and
manipulation of state bureaucracy for private gains, would advance
the global anti-corruption regime.18
Accordingly, this comment will proceed as follows. To provide
the necessary background information, Part II contains three
elements. Part II.A offers a working definition of “grand
corruption.”19 Part II.B provides an overview of Article 7 of the
Rome Statute of the ICC in the context of the enforcement gap in the
international anti-corruption regime.20 Part II.C then introduces the
problem of grand corruption in Nigeria, focusing on the former
regime of Peter Odili, Governor of Rivers State.21
Part III demonstrates that grand corruption constitutes a crime
against humanity pursuant to Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute,

Law on the Quest for Accountability in Africa: The Case Against the “Other”
Impunity, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 749, 777–79 (2002) (advocating for the elevation
of corruption and looting of public funds to the status of an international crime);
Brian C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International
Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 159, 200–04 (2000) (contemplating the ICC’s role in the fight against
corruption).
17. See Harms, supra note 16, at 203 (noting scholars who make similar
arguments).
18. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1259 (noting that international criminal
tribunals could be particularly effective due to their considerable power to “trace,
freeze, and seize stolen funds, and . . . exercise jurisdiction where other domestic
or international remedies are unavailable”).
19. See discussion infra Part II.A (distinguishing grand corruption from more
routine forms of corruption).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B (highlighting the scope of “crimes against
humanity” under Article 7 and contemplating its broader application).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C (outlining Odili’s role in the widespread
perpetration of financial and electoral corruption in Rivers State).
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and that Article 7(1)(k) should be used to prosecute Governor Odili.22
Part III.A analyzes the text and jurisprudential application of Article
7(1)(k), concluding that it has the appropriate breadth to apply to the
commission of grand corruption.23 Part III.B then assesses the corrupt
activities of Governor Odili in the context of the interpretation of
Article 7(1)(k) set out in Part III.A. In doing so, it becomes clear that
the Odili regime perpetrated grand corruption, in contravention of the
Rome Statute.24
Finally, Part IV recommends that prospective ICC prosecution of
grand corruption would be bolstered by (1) amending the
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) to include
prosecutorial discretion guidelines that focus on egregious
international crimes occurring on a systemic basis; and (2)
establishing an Anti-Corruption Advisory Board to solicit evidence,
conduct hearings, and make formal recommendations to the OTP for
grand corruption prosecution.25

II. BACKGROUND
A. “GRAND CORRUPTION” DEFINED
In contrast to “petty” forms of corruption, “grand corruption”
involves deep-rooted corruption at high levels of government that
results in the significant misappropriation of wealth and widespread
societal distortions.26 While systemic abuse of power can take
22. See discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that, as a general principle, grand
corruption constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7).
23. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (emphasizing that Article 7 encompasses
systemic crimes with long-term consequences, extending beyond armed conflict
and mass atrocities).
24. See discussion infra Part III.B (concluding that Odili perpetrated grand
corruption in contravention of Article 7).
25. See discussion infra Part IV (recommending that despite significant
political barriers, the ICC offers a functional legal tool to punish corrupt leaders,
deter future grand corruption, and provide effective mechanisms for the recovery
of corrupt assets).
26. See
FAQs
on
Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2013) (distinguishing grand corruption, which “consists of acts
committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central
functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public
good,” from petty corruption, which refers to “everyday abuse of entrusted power
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various forms and can be committed by a range of highly-ranked
public officials, the impact of “grand corruption” is vast, causing
broad erosion of confidence in government, undermining of the rule
of law, and encouraging persistent economic underdevelopment. 27
Therefore, for the purpose of this comment, “grand corruption” is
distinguished by (1) the involvement of high-level public officials,
and (2) the significance of its impact, usually in terms of gross
abuses of power or misappropriation of significant public wealth for
private gains.28

B. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Established to bring justice to “the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community,” Article 7 of the Rome Statute
criminalizes four broad categories of crimes: genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.29 To
accomplish this, the Rome Statute provides the ICC with broad
universal jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute anyone who
perpetrates an international criminal act, so long as the perpetrator’s
by low- and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens,
who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals,
schools, police departments and other agencies”); United Nations Handbook on
Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators, UN OFF.
DRUGS & CRIME 23–24 (2004), available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/Handbook.pdf (noting that grand
corruption involves the distortion of the central functions of government).
27. See Simeon Aisabor Igbinedion, A Critical Appraisal of the Mechanism for
Prosecuting Grand Corruption Offenders Under the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption 2003, 6 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 56, 58 (citing George
Moody Stuart, GRAND CORRUPTION: HOW BUSINESS BRIBES DAMAGE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Democracy and ‘Grand’
Corruption, 48 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 365 (1996)) (explaining that grand corruption is
more extreme than petty corruption because grand corruption is perpetrated by
“presidents, heads of States and governments, prime ministers, or other highlyplaced government officials” and results in a lack of public confidence in
government, the rule of law, and economic stability).
28. See Sanjeev Gupta et al., Does Corruption Affect Inequality and Poverty?
7–8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/87/76, 1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9876.pdf (concluding that systemic
corruption has significant distributional consequences, as it affects budgetary
revenues and expenditures, increases inequality and poverty, and decreases
economic development).
29. Rome Statute, supra note 15, pmbl., art. 5(1).
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state is a party to the Statute and the acts were committed after the
Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.30 ICC prosecution is
restricted by the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute,
which limits ICC jurisdiction to crimes that the host state is
unwilling or unable to actively pursue.31 To these ends, many states
have enacted implementing legislation that provides for the
investigation and prosecution of crimes that fall under the
jurisdiction of the ICC.32
As the scope of “crimes against humanity” under the Rome Statute
is at the root of this comment, a close reading of Article 7 is
necessary to articulate its breadth and applicability to crimes of grand
corruption as “other inhumane acts.”33 Article 7(1) states:
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or
forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe
30. Id. arts. 11, 24 (establishing the non-retroactivity principle, which
temporally limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to after the Rome Statute came into force);
id. arts. 12–13 (establishing universal jurisdiction); Princeton University Program
in Law and Public Affairs, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, U.
MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR. principle 1(1) (2001), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/princeton.html (defining universal jurisdiction as criminal jurisdiction
concerned only with the nature of a particular crime that disregards any other
jurisdictional issues such as “where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction”).
31. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, pmbl. (“Emphasizing that the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions.”); id. art. 1 (noting that the ICC “shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction”); id. art. 17 (limiting the ICC
jurisdiction to circumstances where the host states are unwilling or unable to carry
out investigation and/or prosecution).
32. See, e.g., Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court Act 2002, Government Notice (GN) 23642, § 3 (S. Afr.) (enabling the
government “as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of
complementarity . . . the national prosecuting authority of the Republic to
adjudicate cases brought against any person accused of having committed a crime
in the Republic and beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances”).
33. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (Oct. 2, 1995) (recognizing that crimes against humanity under
customary international law extend well beyond international armed conflict so
long as they comport to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege).
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deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j)
The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.34

Under Article 7(1)’s chapeau, the prohibited crimes of Article 7
reach international criminal status only if they meet certain threshold
contextual requirements.35 First, crimes against humanity must be the
result of an “attack.”36 Article 7(2) defines “attack” broadly as the
commission of any prohibited act that is “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”37 As such, the notion
of an “attack” is not confined to armed conflict or State infliction of
violence.
Under the chapeau, the attack also must be “widespread or
systemic”—not a random act of violence—and must occur either on
a grand scale against a multiplicity of victims or as part of a regular
policy scheme.38 Further, the attack must target a “civilian
34. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1).
35. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶
646 (May 7, 1997) (explaining that crimes unrelated to widespread or systematic
attacks on a civilian population should not be prosecuted as crimes against
humanity).
36. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1).
37. Id. art. 7(2)(a); see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzidana, Case No.
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 122 (May 21, 1999) (holding that an attack must be
connected to the crime); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, ¶ 581 (Sept 2, 1998) (finding that the concept of an “attack” can be
defined as an unlawful act pursuant to the enumerated provisions of the statute and
noting that an attack also may be non-violent in nature).
38. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 579–80 (defining “widespread or
systemic”); Kayishema & Ruzidana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 123 (“The attack
must contain one of the alternative conditions of being widespread or systematic.
A widespread attack is one that is directed against a multiplicity of victims. A
systematic attack means an attack carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or
plan. Either of these conditions will serve to exclude isolated or random inhumane
acts committed for purely personal reasons.”).
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population.”39 As a result, in order for Article 7 to be implicated, the
attack must victimize members of the population not playing an
active role in any hostilities or armed conflict underway.40
Perhaps most importantly, the chapeau of Article 7 mandates that
perpetrators of crimes against humanity have a sufficient level of
knowledge about the attack.41 Article 30 of the Rome Statute
provides clarification that the mens rea for ICC offenses, unless
otherwise provided, includes direct and constructive forms of “intent
and knowledge.”42 As a result, the cumulative effect of these
provisions render perpetrators liable in circumstances where they did
not intend to bring about the objective elements of the crime, but
nevertheless knew that the consequence would occur in the ordinary
course of events.43
This comment focuses on the residual criminal law power in
Article 7(1)(k), which prohibits “other inhumane acts” that are
similarly grave to those expressly enumerated in Article 7(1). 44 In
39. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 638 (clarifying that
the targeted population must be predominantly civilian, but that the presence of
non-civilians does not create a per se exclusion of the population).
40. See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 582 (defining “civilian
population”); Kayishema & Ruzidana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 127–30 (noting
that “civilian” and “civilian population” are terms to be understood as applying
within the context of war as well as relative peace); see also Tadic, IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 644 (noting that attacking a “civilian population” does
not mean the perpetrator must target or victimize the entire population; rather, so
long as an individual or collective is attacked because of his membership in the
targeted civilian population, the attack will be deemed against the “civilian
population”).
41. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1) (requiring that the perpetrator
have contextual knowledge of the “attack”).
42. See id. art. 30(2) (defining “intent” as when a person “means to engage in
the conduct . . . [or] means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur
in the ordinary course of events” and “knowledge” as “awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”);
see also Kayishema & Ruzidana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 133 (concluding that
the “knowledge” requirement in the ICTR statute conforms to that of Article 7 in
the Rome Statute).
43. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 525–39 (Sept. 30, 2008) (advancing that
intention and knowledge can be inferred from participation in a common plan that
results in the commission of prohibited acts).
44. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(k) (criminalizing “[o]ther
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”); id. Elements of Crimes,
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addition to satisfying the chapeau, Article 7(1)(k) requires that the
act or omission must be inhumane.45 The consequences of the attack
must also be intentional, either explicitly intended or inferred from
their predictable effect.46 Under Article 25, this includes intending to
oversee a chain of command or intending to play a role in a common
plan.47 Finally, since the harm must be “of similar character” to those
crimes listed in Article 7(1), it must be the cause of “great suffering
or serious injury to mental or physical health of the victim.”48 As
art. 7(1)(k) (elaborating on the Article 7(1)(k) requirements); cf. Charter of the
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
279; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art.
5(i), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1–2, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3(i), U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955, SC res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
(prohibiting “other inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity). See generally
Terhi Jyrkkiö, ‘Other Inhumane Acts’ as Crimes Against Humanity, 1 HELSINKI L.
REV. 183, 203 (2011) (arguing that although the term “other humane acts” is a
constant in international criminal law statutes, the scope of the term is contingent
on the expressly enumerated crimes listed in each particular statute); Darryl
Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 AM.
J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (1999) (explaining that Article 7(1)(k) language was included in
the Rome Statute as a compromise to those who wanted to preserve the “other
inhumane acts” provision and those who were concerned about its open-ended
nature).
45. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(k); see Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case
No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 366 (Mar. 22, 2006) (requiring that “inhumane acts”
include proof of an act or omission that causes serious mental or physical suffering
or injury, or an act that constitutes a serious attack on human dignity).
46. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 137 (June 15, 2009)
(“[E]xistence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and
circumstances.”); Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A,
Judgment, ¶ 40 (July 7, 2006) (emphasizing that, absent a rare admission from the
accused, intent must be inferred).
47. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 25(3) (establishing criminal liability
for jointly-perpetrated offenses).
48. See Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević & Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (Jan. 17, 2005) (summarizing the ICTY’s case law as
specifying that an admissible injury “need not be permanent or irremediable, but it
must be harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s
ability to lead a normal and constructive life”) (internal quotations omitted); see
also Starr, supra note 10, at 1300 (citing Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson,
Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 102 (Roy Lee ed., 1999)) (noting that
the “of similar character” requirement was inserted to quell concerns about Article
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such, to satisfy this causation element, the “inhumane act” must be
sufficiently connected to the resulting harm.49 Under Article 7,
however, the injury need not be the immediate consequence of the
“inhumane act” and can result from general actions that cause
collective harm to a population.50
Although used only sparingly to date, Article 7(1)(k)
jurisprudence indicates that the ICC has broad discretion to charge
individuals with crimes that are not listed expressly in the Rome
Statute.51 Likewise, ad hoc tribunals (namely, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)) also have
prosecuted “other inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity in a
similar manner.52 Therefore, Article 7(1)(k) must be viewed as
7(1)(k) being too vague).
49. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 148–54 (May 21, 1999) (“These will be acts or omissions that
deliberately cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitute a
serious attack on human dignity.”).
50. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1) (criminalizing systemic conduct
that causes collective harm).
51. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 456, 461 (Sept. 30, 2008) (advancing that these
actions constituted the type of suffering that falls under the purview of Article
7(1)(k) even though the Chamber refused to convict on the basis that the same
alleged acts could not be simultaneously prosecuted as murder and “other
inhumane acts”); Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo &
Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony
Issued on 8th July 2005 as Amended on 27th September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005)
(charging “other inhumane acts” for the infliction of “serious bodily injury and
suffering” against civilian residents of an internally displaced persons camp). See
generally WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 181–86 (2010) (providing an overview of
Article 7(1)(k) application).
52. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3(i),
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
(prohibiting “other inhumane acts” if committed “as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian”); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5(i), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.
at 1–2 (May 25, 1993) (barring “other inhumane acts” if committed “in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”); see
also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 688–97 (Sept 2,
1998) (interpreting the “other inhumane acts” provision of the ICTR Statute to
include coerced nudity of Tutsi women); Blagojević & Jokić, IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 623–30 (recognizing as “other inhumane acts” under the ICTY
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encompassing a broad array of unenumerated criminal acts so long as
they are similarly grave to the enumerated crimes against humanity
and satisfy the chapeau requirements in Article 7(1).53

C. CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: THE CASE OF PETER ODILI
Nigeria presents a useful case study to demonstrate the need for
ICC prosecution against grand corruption.54 Since the discovery of
oil in the 1950s,55 the Nigerian government has ruled by way of
Statute the forced bussing of thousands of women, children, and elderly on the
basis that they were not told where they were going, that they were abused by Serb
soldiers, and that they were subjected to unbearable conditions). But see Rome
Statute, supra note 15, art. 22 (mandating that the “definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted”). See generally id. art. 21(2) (“The Court may apply
principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.”);
SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 396 (noting and providing examples of regular ICC
invocation of ad hoc tribunals on matters of substantive law).
53. See, e.g., Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony
Issued on 8th July 2005 as Amended on 27th September 2005 (charging “other
inhumane acts” for the infliction of “serious bodily injury and suffering” against
civilian residents of an internally displaced persons); Prosecutor v. Ahmad
Muhammad Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad
Harun (Apr. 27, 2007) (charging “other inhumane acts” for directing Sudanese
Armed Forces and Militia/Janjawee to carry out attacks against the populations of
Bindisi and Arawala); Blagojević & Jokić, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 627
(concluding that it should assess “similar seriousness” in light of the factual
circumstances, including the context of the attack and the physical, mental and
moral effects on the victim(s)); see also SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 185 (noting
serious physical and mental injuries that fall short of murder fall under Article
7(1)(k), including mutilation and other forms of “severe bodily harm, beatings and
other acts of violence, serious physical and mental injury, inhumane and degrading
treatment, forced prostitution, forced disappearance, sniping at civilians, and
forced marriage”).
54. See, e.g., T.B. Bamidele et al., Corruption in Nigeria: An Impediment to
Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 4 J. ECON. & SUSTAINABLE DEV.
10, 16 (2013) (finding empirical evidence of corruption reducing life expectancy
and economic growth in Nigeria); Adetokunbo Mumuni, Request to ICC on $6bn
Fuel Subsidy Loot, SOCIO-ECON. RTS. & ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Apr. 20,
2012), http://serap-nigeria.org/request-to-icc-on-6bn-fuel-subsidy-loot/ (requesting
that the ICC investigate allegations of crimes against humanity as a result of
massive corruption and theft of more than $6 billion in the fuel subsidy scheme
over three years).
55. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s
Emergence as a Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty, 21 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 402–03 (2009) (explaining the origins of oil discovery
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kleptocracy and currently is one of the most corrupt countries in the
world;56 it suffers from systemic corruption, including pension fund
theft, significant daily losses of oil due to illegal bunkering, and an
ineffective judiciary.57 In addition, although widespread corruption in
Nigeria is commonly recognized, corruption remains largely
unaffected by domestic anti-corruption initiatives, and international
commitments under UNCAC and the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption.58
While examples of corruption in Nigeria abound, this comment
focuses on the regime of Peter Odili, former governor of Rivers
State, to illustrate the grand scale of Nigerian corruption and the need
for ICC prosecution. As a lifelong politician and leader of the
People’s Democratic Party (“PDP”), Odili governed the oil rich
region of Rivers State between 1999 and 2007.59 During his tenure,
in Nigeria).
56. See Corruption Perception Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2012),
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (ranking Nigeria 139th out of 174
countries); Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption
and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0107[1].pdf [hereinafter Chop
Fine] (“Nigeria has produced several hundred billion dollars worth of oil since
independence in 1960, but ordinary Nigerians have derived appallingly little
benefit from all of that wealth. This situation exists primarily because successive
governments, both military and civilian, have stolen or misused much of Nigeria’s
tremendous oil wealth. The head of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission has stated that the country lost as much as $380 billion to corruption
and waste between 1960 and 1999, the year Nigeria’s current government came to
power.”).
57. See, e.g., Igbinedion, supra note 27, at 60–62 (observing that despite the
variety of laws enacted to fight government corruption, significant impunity
remains for high profile offenders); Ocheje, supra note 16, at 753–57 (noting that
grand corruption in Nigeria has resulted in significant accumulation of public
wealth in offshore bank accounts and investments); Owens, supra note 5, at 1029–
30 (2002) (observing that the concentration of oil wealth in Sub-Saharan Africa
perpetuates political corruption and violence against minority factions).
58. See, e.g., World Report 2012: Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/nigeria_2012.pdf
(noting
that many corruption cases against senior political figures remain stalled in court
and that foreign countries remain reluctant to pressure the Nigerian government on
its human rights record); see also Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 95–102 (providing
an overview of the faltering anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria).
59. See David U. Enweremadu, Conference Paper, Ending the Vicious Circle:
Oil, Corruption, and Violent Conflict in the Niger-Delta, IFRA-NIGERIA (Nov. 17,
2009),
http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/David_U-_ENWEREMADU_-
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Odili wielded vast political power within Nigeria’s decentralized
federal system; he also oversaw rampant corruption and a lagging
standard of living, which largely contributed to the overall
underdevelopment of the state.60
1. Financial Corruption: The Looting of the Rivers State Treasury
In January of 2007, the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (“EFCC”) issued a report of its investigation into the
finances of the Rivers State government under then-outgoing
Governor Peter Odili.61 The report disclosed that “over 100 billion
Naira of Rivers State funds have been diverted by the Governor” and
contained substantiated allegations that implicated Odili for crimes
of fraud, conspiracy, conversion of public funds, foreign exchange
malpractice, money laundering, stealing, and abuse of oath of
office.62 Draft charges prepared by the EFCC, which became public
in February of 2013, reached the same conclusion and provided
further elaboration on the extent of Odili’s corruption.63
Specifically, the EFCC Report and Draft Charges disclosed that
_Ending_the_Vicious_Circle_Oil_Corruption_and_Violent_conflict_in_the_Niger
_Delta.pdf (noting that Governor Odili’s tenure in office was plagued with
corruption).
60. Id.; see also CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 308 (providing civil and
criminal immunity to elected officials in Nigeria while in office); Human
Development Report: Nigeria 2008-2009, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (2009),
available
at
http://web.ng.undp.org/documents/NHDR2009/NHDR_SUMMARY_20082009.pdf [hereinafter Nigeria 2008–2009] (outlining those socio-economic
indicators in Rivers State indicative of abject governance and corruption).
61. See Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act
(2004), §§ 28, 37 (Nigeria) (providing EFCC the statutory mandate to investigate
crimes and issue official reports).
62. See ECON. & FIN. CRIMES COMM’N, THE INTERIM REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF A CASE OF ALLEGED CONSPIRACY, ABUSE OF OFFICE,
FRAUDULENT CONVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MALPRACTICE, STEALING AND MONEY LAUNDERING (2007), available at
http://www.pointblanknews.com/os1540.html [hereinafter
EFCC REPORT]
(implicating Odili for looting over ₦100 billion of Rivers State funds).
63. Draft Charges Against Dr. Peter Odili in the High Court of the Federal
Capital Territory Holden at Abuja, ECON. & FIN. CRIMES COMM’N (2007),
available
at
http://saharareporters.com/content/efccs-draft-criminal-chargesagainst-former-gov-peter-odili-500million-plunder-rivers-state [hereinafter Draft
Charges] (revealing that Odili manipulated a combination of government officials
and personal companies to plunder over ₦100 billion in the 2004–2007 period).
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Governor Odili engaged in concerted activities to loot the state
treasury.64 For example, the Report and the Draft Charges revealed
that Odili collaborated with Johnson Arumemi-Ikhide, a prominent
business executive, to use the Rockson Engineering Company Ltd. as
a front for systematic theft from the Rivers State government
treasury.65 Arumemi-Ikhide had longstanding business ties to Odili
dating back to the mid-1980s, when he served as intermediary
between Negris Engineering and the Rivers State Government,
securing two major energy contracts for Negris.66 When ArumemiIkhide left Negris to form Rockson Engineering Company in 2000,
Rockson provided Odili with an opportunity to plunder Rivers
State’s public resources.67 For example, Rockson was at the forefront
of the failed mass investment in gas turbines, which many regarded
as a scam to siphon public sector money into the hands of Odili’s
allies.68 Under Odili’s supervision as governor, between 2004 and
2006 over ₦30 billion were channeled into Rockson’s Zeinith Bank
Plc account.69 EFCC investigations further revealed that many of
these funds were then transferred to third-party accounts, used to
purchase foreign exchange, and exported out of the country.70 In
addition, the EFCC revealed that Rockson held a parallel account in
which the Rivers State government made unexplained deposits,

64. EFCC REPORT, supra note 62; Draft Charges, supra note 63.
65. EFCC REPORT, supra note 62 (implicating Odili for corrupt ties to
additional companies, including: Arik Airlines, Courage Communications Ltd,
Attn Ltd, Ragolis Water Ltd, M/S Wetland Health Services Ltd, Transky Ltd, Foby
Eng. Ltd, First Medical/Sterile Company Ltd, Habila Resources Ltd, Ojemai Farms
Ltd, Ojemai Investments Ltd, and Godsonic Oil Company Ltd, an Odili-owned oil
company that also has business interests in the Nigeria/Sao Tome Joint
Development Zone).
66. See id. ¶¶ 4.2–4.5 (establishing the Odili’s historical ties to ArumemiIkhide).
67. Id.
68. See id. ¶¶ 4.1–4.16 (finding concrete evidence of Odili’s outright
budgetary theft and funneling of public funds into a variety of baseless public
projects).
69. Id. ¶ 4.6; see also Draft Charges, supra note 63 (alleging that over the
course of this period, Rockson received over ₦60 billion from Rivers State
accounts).
70. EFCC REPORT, supra note 62, ¶ 4.14 (finding that Rockson also
transferred over $120 million to various banks overseas, through JM/JEM Air and
Thomas Eggar, a UK law firm, and that over £2 million and €1 million were
separately transferred in the same manner).

644

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:3

indicating that the account functioned as a government slush fund.71
Focusing on the 2006 Rivers State budget, Human Rights Watch
investigations confirm the trend of financial corruption under the
Odili regime.72 Increases in the price of oil caused the budget to
balloon, with enormous sums of money flowing into the governor’s
office.73 Problematically, much of the money was allocated to Odili
on vague terms, making it susceptible to abuse.74 The 2006 budget
also included gross expenditures on items that had little connection
to state priorities, including lavish entertainment, accommodations,
and transportation for members of Odili’s inner circle.75 Although
one would expect that such a large budget windfall would have
resulted in state investments in Rivers State infrastructure, the
evidence suggests the majority of money was lost due to
extravagance, waste, and corruption, all which proved common
features of the Odili regime.76
As state governor, Odili also oversaw rampant corruption at the
local government level, which directly perpetuated the deterioration

71. See EFCC REPORT, supra note 62, ¶¶ 4.12 (discovering that between 2001
and 2002, over ₦12 billion were deposited and thereafter withdrawn, from
Rockson’s parallel UBA PLC account; according to the Report, this provided
“clear evidence of direct looting of the treasury of Rivers state”).
72. See generally Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 75–83 (providing a
comprehensive overview of budgetary corruption in Rivers State).
73. See id. at 76–78 (finding that the size of the 2006 Rivers State budget
dwarfed that of other African countries).
74. See id. at 77–78 (citing Rivers State 2006 Budget, Heads 412(9),
412(12A), 467B(1)) (noting that Odili was granted budgets for unspecified
“Grants, Contributions and Donations” and “Grants for Women, Youths and Other
Organizations” to be handed out by the Governor’s Office at the rate of more than
$91,000 per day, or roughly ₦4.33 billion ($33.2 million) over the course of the
year; a Security Vote of ₦5 billion (nearly $38.5 million); and ₦10 billion ($77
million) for unspecified “Special Projects,” which did not appear in the 2005
budget).
75. See id. (citing Rivers State 2006 Budget, Heads 468(C), 412(2A), 412(14),
470(B), 470(C), 467A(1)) (finding that transport and travel budgets totaled more
than $65,000 per day; budgets for catering services, entertainment, and visitor gifts
totaled ₦1.3 billion ($10 million); budgets for two helicopters and the construction
of landing facilities totaled ₦5 billion ($38.4 million), on top of ₦1.5 billion
allocated for the purchase of two jet aircraft in 2005; and budgets for purchasing
new vehicles for Government House totaled ₦1.5 billion ($11.5 million), even
though ₦800 million was budgeted for this same purpose in 2005).
76. See id. (emphasizing the comparative size of Rivers State’s budget).
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of social services in Rivers State.77 Although Odili did not exercise
immediate control over the carrying out of these acts, as governor he
is implicated for the failure to adhere to his statutory duty to oversee
all local government finances,78 for the lack of transparency
surrounding state oversight,79 and for benefiting by being complicit
in local corruption.80 As such, local government corruption must be
viewed as an important element of the widespread corruption under
the Odili regime.
2. Electoral Corruption and the Use of Violence to Solidify Power
The role of high-level government officials in perpetrating
systemic economic corruption is largely intertwined with massive
electoral corruption, which is used to solidify political power and
accrue financial benefits.81 Odili repeatedly demonstrated his
77. See id. at 32, 36, 56 (outlining specific instances of local level corruption:
in 2005, when the chair of Khana’s local government received an illegal allocation
salary and allowances worth $376,000, a sum that amounted to “nearly half the
total amount allocated for the wages and allowances of Khana’s 325 health-sector
workers”; in 2006, when the chair of Tai’s local government received an allocation
by a security vote worth $300,000, exceeding the council’s total capital budgets for
either health or education; and, in 2005–2006, when the chairman of Opobo
Nkoro’s local government awarded himself $92,000 worth of construction
contracts).
78. See Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 83–84, 90 (citing Rivers State Local
Government Law, No. 3 of 1999, §§ 13, 114, 117) (describing the State’s oversight
power and failure to examine local government finances and sanction corrupt local
officials).
79. See id. at 84 (describing that the State government ignores its oversight
obligations with regard to local levels of government).
80. See id. at 102 (“[The] state has been extremely lax in holding those
officials to account, in part because state-level politicians expect the chairmen to
‘make returns’ on their embezzled fund. Just as important, politicians . . . rely upon
the chairmen to mobilize violence and otherwise manipulate the results of state and
federal elections in their constituencies. As one prominent Port Harcourt-based
activist put it, ‘The governor never challenges the local government chairmen over
their corruption because those chairmen are the governor’s champions of
violence.’”).
81. See Nigeria’s 2003 Election: The Unacknowledged Violence, HUM. RTS.
WATCH 41–42 (2004), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604/nigeria0604
.pdf [hereinafter Nigeria’s 2003 Election] (“[C]onditions in Rivers State seemed to
be in a different league from those observed by our teams in other parts of the
country . . . there was serious violence, intimidation and vote rigging.”) (quoting
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA, 12 AND 19 APRIL 2003: REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH
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willingness to bribe interest groups and hire gangs to inflict violence
on his political opponents during the 2003 election.82 Led by Odili,
the PDP contracted with two gangs at the forefront of violent crimes
and militant activity throughout the River State: the Niger Delta
Peoples Volunteer Force (“NDPVF”) and the Niger Delta Vigilante
(“NDV”).83 Despite Odili’s denials, admissions made by the leader of
the NDV, Ateke Tom, clearly evidence Odili’s involvement in the
dispatching of gangs to intimidate and attack his opposition.84
Testimony of gang leaders in Port Harcourt also confirms Odili’s
sponsorship of youth gangs to eliminate his political opponents. 85 To
make matters worse, after the election, many of the promises to pay,
arm, and create jobs for the armed youth groups never materialized,
fueling a rapid deterioration in the relationship between the state
government and armed groups, and propelling a new wave of
violence.86
OBSERVER GROUP (2003)); see also Rotimi Suberu, The Nigerian Federal System:
Performance, Problems and Prospects, 28 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 459, 469–71
(2010) (exploring the connection between widespread economic corruption and
electoral corruption in Nigeria).
82. See Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria,
HUM. RTS. WATCH 80–81 (2007), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/
nigeria1007webwcover.pdf [hereinafter Criminal Politics] (noting that Odili, along
with Secretary to the State Government and Federal Transportation Minister
Abieye Sekibo, reportedly played a central role in sponsoring violent activities,
including those of the NDV under Adeke Tom); see also Nigeria’s 2003 Election,
supra note 81, at 14–19 (recognizing the widespread use of violence to rig the
2003 election); Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State,
HUM. RTS. WATCH 2–6 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/
nigeria0205/nigeria0205.pdf (explaining the practice of driving out opposition
supporters prior to elections).
83. See Criminal Politics, supra note 82, at 81 (finding direct evidence of
Odili’s relationship with the NDPVF and the NDV).
84. Id. (discovering that Ateke Tom worked with Odili during the 2003
election: “Any place Odili sent me, I conquer[ed] for him. I conquer[ed]
everywhere.”); Omololu Ogunmade, Top Leaders Accused in Cult Killings, THIS
DAY (Jan. 28, 2008), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200801280077.html
(referring to affidavit filed in Suit No. PHE/75/2008 CR in Rivers State High
Court, which named Odili as a sponsor of Ateke, who was responsible for killings
and hostage taking in Rivers State).
85. See Criminal Politics, supra note 82, at 85–87 (citing HRW interviews,
Port Harcourt, Apr. 12, 2007, which exposed Odili’s relationship with youth gang
leaders and the million-Naira payments he made to disrupt the elections in 1999
and 2003).
86. See id. at 82 (“The armed groups, particularly the youth, felt betrayed by
the kind of contracts they made with politicians in 2003. They felt that having
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3. Judicial Corruption and the Accountability Deficit
Despite compelling evidence documenting Odili’s corruption, the
judiciary of Rivers State has demonstrated an unwillingness to take
action against the former governor. As a result, important questions
arise about the impartiality of Nigeria’s judiciary, both during and
after Odili’s time in office.
Following the publication of the 2007 EFCC Report, for example,
the judiciary granted Odili a series of favorable judicial decisions on
procedural grounds, which culminated in a “perpetual injunction”
against the EFCC from pursuing corruption charges.87 The same
injunction was upheld on appeal.88 In addition to the lack of
accountability for corruption, Odili won a number of more recent
judicial decisions, further absolving him of any wrongdoing. In 2009,
the Federal Court in Abuja issued another interim injunction
preventing the EFCC from arresting, detaining, prosecuting or
participated in rigging the election, they deserved a stake.”); The Security Situation
in Rivers State: An Open Letter from Amnesty International to Peter Odili, State
Governor of Rivers State, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 15 2004), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/027/2004/en/e4eeb5db-d58c11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/afr440272004en.pdf (describing the 2004 outbreak of
violence in Rivers State).
87. See Attorney-Gen. for Rivers State v. Econ. & Fin. Crimes Comm’n &
Ors, [2007] FHC/PHC/CSI78/2007 (Nigeria) (granting all the declaratory and
injunctive reliefs sought by Odili, including a declaration that the EFCC
investigations are invalid, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void; an injunction
restraining the EFCC and other parties from publicizing the report of the
investigation; and an injunction restraining the EFCC from any further action in
relation to the alleged economic and financial crimes committed by Odili); Petition
to the National Judicial Council Against Justice Ibrahim N. Buba in Relation to
Peter Odili, SAHARA REPORTERS (Nov. 20, 2009), available at
http://saharareporters.com/petition/petition-national-judicial-council-againstjustice-ibrahim-n-buba-relation-peter-odili?page=1 (denouncing the abovementioned “acts of judicial misconduct” and calling for the removal of Justice
Buba from office).
88. See Econ. & Fin. Crimes Comm’n (EFCC) v. Attorney-Gen. for Rivers
State & Ors, [2011] CA/PH/622/2008 (Nigeria) (holding that the subsisting
judgment of March 2007 is binding on all parties and that a perpetual injunction
prevents the EFCC from arresting, detaining and arraigning Odili); see also
Nuruddeen M. Abdallah & Bashiru Abdullahi, Nigeria: EFCC Drops Graft Case
Against
Odili,
Daily
Trust
(Aug.
7,
2012),
available
at
http://allafrica.com/stories/201208070256.html?viewall=1; Sahara Reporters, Peter
Odili’s Perpetual Injunction, Ocnus Net (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Africa_8/Peter-Odili-s-Perpetual-Injunction.shtml
(providing a historical overview of the perpetual injunction that Odili obtained).
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embarrassing Odili over a ₦189 debt owed to Finbank.89 The same
court also issued a separate order prohibiting the EFCC from
auctioning or trespassing on Odili’s property to realize security for
his indebtedness to the bank.90 Finally, while Odili secured numerous
judicial victories, his wife was appointed to the judiciary and later
promoted to the nation’s highest court—raising further questions
about the judicial system’s impartiality and overall efficacy.91
While the available evidence does not directly implicate Odili in
judicial corruption (e.g., judicial bribery), the unwillingness of the
judiciary to prosecute Odili for perpetrating widespread corruption is
certainly apparent.92 In this respect, the accountability deficit in
Nigeria underscores the lack of a functional domestic remedy for
egregious corruption; it also highlights the availability and need for
ICC prosecution.93

III. ANALYSIS
This comment argues that the ICC should exercise its authority
under the Rome Statute to prosecute government officials for
perpetrating grand corruption. Advancing that grand corruption
constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(k), Part III.A
develops the doctrinal basis for the crime, addresses the parameters
89. See Ise-Oluwa Ige, Ex-Gov Odili Gets Court’s Relief on ₦189m Loan,
Assets, VANGUARD (Sep. 3, 2009), available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/
2009/09/ex-gov-odili-gets-courts-relief-on-n189m-loan-assets/.
90. Id.; see also Idris Akinbajo, Indicted Odili to Get 8 Police Security, 2
Houses, Exotic Cars as Retirement Benefit, SAHARA REPORTERS (Apr. 10, 2012),
available at http://saharareporters.com/news-page/indicted-odili-get-8-policesecurity-2-houses-exotic-cars-retirement-benefit (underscoring the lack of
accountability for corrupt public officials in Nigeria).
91. See Odili’s Wife Ascends to the Supreme Court, SAHARA REPORTERS (Feb.
8, 2011), available at http://saharareporters.com/news-page/odilis-wife-ascendssupreme-court (explaining Mary Odili’s judicial rise).
92. See Draft Criminal Charges Detail How Gov. Peter Odili Plundered
Rivers States $500million to Set up Arik Air and Buy up Media at AIT, Thisday,
Newswatch and ChannelsTV, SAHARA REPORTERS (Feb. 22, 2013), available at
http://saharareporters.com/news-page/draft-criminal-charges-detail-how-gov-peterodili-plundered-rivers-states-500million-set-a (alleging that Mary Odili ensured
her husband received favorable judicial treatment).
93. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, pmbl. (“Emphasizing that the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions.”); id. art. 1 (noting that the Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions).
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of its application, and establishes the legal basis for grand corruption
as an international criminal act.94 Part III.B then considers the Odili
case study and outlines Odili’s prospective liability under the Rome
Statute for perpetrating grand corruption during his tenure as
governor in Rivers State. In this context, it analyzes grand corruption
under the Odili regime with regard to the chapeau requirements of
Article 7(1), and the actus reus and mens rea elements of Article
7(1)(k).95

A. GRAND CORRUPTION CONSTITUTES A CRIME AGAINST
HUMANITY UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE
To constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(k), the
requirements set out in the Article 7(1) chapeau must first be
satisfied.96 Creating threshold contextual requirements for Article 7
crimes, the chapeau requires that the act be part of an attack directed
against a civilian population, be either “widespread” or “systematic,”
and be perpetrated against a civilian population by someone aware
that his or her act was connected to the broader attack.97 Further,
under Article 7(1)(k), “other inhumane acts” must be “of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health.”98 Accordingly, this subsection
analyzes the required elements of Article 7(1)(k) in conjunction with
features of grand corruption, concluding that Article 7 provides the
appropriate authority for grand corruption to constitute a crime

94. See discussion infra Part III.A (concluding that grand corruption
constitutes a crime against humanity).
95. See discussion infra Part III.B (finding that Odili committed grand
corruption in violation of Article 7).
96. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 77–209 (June 15,
2009) (evaluating the chapeau before the specific Article 7 crime).
97. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1); see also KRIANGSAK
KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 128 (2001) (defining the actus
reus and mens rea for Article 7(1)(k) crimes).
98. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(k); see also id. Elements of Crimes,
art. 7(1)(k) (requiring that Article 7(1)(k) crimes include: (1) that the infliction of
“great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means
of inhumane act”; (2) that the act was of “similar character” or the acts enumerated
in Article 7; and (3) that the perpetrator “was aware of the factual circumstances
that established the character of the act”).
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against humanity under the Rome Statute.
1. Grand Corruption Satisfies the Contextual Requirements for
Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity
Under Article 7, crimes against humanity must satisfy three
chapeau elements: that the act was part of an attack directed against
a civilian population; that the attack was widespread or systemic; and
that the accused knew that his act was connected to the attacks.99
Article 7(2) defines an “attack” broadly as “a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph
one against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such act.”100 As such,
neither military nor armed conflict is necessary, nor does an attack
require the infliction of violence.101 Rather, this element is satisfied
so long as the state’s policy is carried out in contravention of one of
the listed criminal acts in Article 7(1).102 Moreover, the jurisprudence
from ad hoc tribunals and the history of negotiations for the ICC
indicate that state policies need not be formal to be prosecuted.103
While occasional engagement in corrupt practices would likely not
be deemed to be pursuant to or in furtherance of state policy, deeprooted corruption inextricably tied to abject governance would likely
satisfy the requirement.104 Budgetary diversions, siphoning of
99. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1) (“‘[C]rime against humanity’ means
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack.”).
100. Id. art. 7(2)(a); see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, ¶ 581 (Sept 2, 1998) (finding that the concept of an “attack” can be
defined as an unlawful act pursuant to the enumerated provisions of the statute);
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 122
(May 21, 1999) (holding that attack must be connected to the crime).
101. See SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 101–02 (citing Elements of Crimes, art. 7)
(“The attack need not be a military attack.”).
102. Id.
103. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶
653 (May 7, 1997) (“[S]uch a policy need not be formalized and can be deduced
from the way in which the acts occur.”); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 204–05 (Mar. 2, 2000) (“This plan . . . need not
necessarily be declared expressly or even stated clearly and precisely . . . [and]
may be surmised from a series of events.”); see also Starr, supra note 10, at 1305
(noting that the ICC jurisprudence and negotiating history indicate that illegitimate
or unofficial uses of state authority can nevertheless constitute state “policy”).
104. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1304–05 (observing that grand corruption
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government funds, and other abuses of government power, even if
unauthorized, may constitute “attacks” on the basis that they are state
“policies” directed against civilian populations.105
An attack must also be widespread or systematic.106 Case law
indicates that “widespread” refers to both the scale and nature of the
attack, as well as the number of victims.107 In contrast, “systematic”
refers to the “organised nature of the acts of violence and the
improbability of their random occurrence.”108 Crimes that occur in
non-accidental patterns are deemed systematic.109 The impact and
pervasive character of grand corruption likely satisfies both criteria.
Grand corruption should be viewed as widespread due to its breadth
and its detrimental impact on the lives of many.110 Additionally,
grand corruption should be viewed as systematic where it entails
ongoing abuse of the budgetary process or outright theft of
government funds.111 Moreover, the involvement of high-level
government officials in carrying out state policy to serve private
interests confirms the widespread and systematic nature of grand
corruption.112
The accused also must understand that his actions are connected to

involves official state actions).
105. Id.; see Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(2) (defining “attack” broadly as
“a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in
paragraph one against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack”).
106. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1); see also Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, ¶ 82 (June 15, 2009) (noting that “widespread” and “systematic”
are disjunctive and that both need not be present in actionable offense); Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 271 (July 15, 1999)
(concluding that those crimes unrelated to widespread or systematic attacks on a
civilian population do not constitute crimes against humanity).
107. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 427–28 (June 12, 2002).
108. Id. ¶ 429.
109. Id.
110. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1304–05 (describing the widespread nature of
egregious grand corruption).
111. Id.
112. Cf. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 149 (noting that “widespread” and
“systematic” are to be construed broadly and often overlap).
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the attack against a civilian population.113 Under this requirement,
perpetrators must have a baseline contextual awareness of the attack,
but are not required to know all of its details. 114 As Article 7(1)(k)
creates a more onerous mens rea element (intention, as discussed
below), the “knowledge” requirement of the chapeau is somewhat
redundant; however, if a government official intentionally
orchestrates systematic corruption, he certainly also would have
awareness of the broader context of his actions.115
2. Grand Corruption Is Inherently Inhumane as It Causes Great
Suffering and Serious Injury
In contrast to less severe forms of corruption, grand corruption
causes significant suffering and injury, similar to the crimes
enumerated in Article 7; therefore, it must be regarded as
inhumane.116 ICC tribunals have broadly defined “great suffering, or
serious injury to body” to encompass a wide variety of physical and
psychological harms.117 Further, they indicate that it must be assessed
113. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1); see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema
& Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 133–34 (May 21, 1999) (noting
that a perpetrator must “knowingly commit crimes against humanity in the sense
that he must understand the overall context of his act,” i.e., that the perpetrator
must act with knowledge of the broader context of the attack, “a view which
conforms to the wording of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Article 7”).
114. See Kayishema & Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 133–34
(advancing that constructive knowledge suffices to meet the chapeau requirement).
115. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶
657, 659 (May 7, 1997) (holding that knowledge is to be determined objectively
and can be implied from the circumstances); see also Starr, supra note 10, at 1305
(advancing that perpetrators of systemic corruption would easily satisfy this
requirement).
116. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 362 (Mar. 22,
2006) (defining inhumane acts as those that cause “serious mental or physical
suffering or injury” or constitute a “serious attack on human dignity”); Starr, supra
note 10, at 1299–1300 (noting that the inhumane element is redundant in light of
the harm and suffering requirement).
117. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 456–59 (Sept. 30, 2008) (asserting that non-fatal
gunfire and machete attacks satisfied the actus reus element of Article 7(1)(k));
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo & Dominic Ongwen,
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8th July
2005 as Amended on 27th September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005) (charging perpetrators
with infliction of “serious bodily injury and suffering” for attacks rendered against
civilian residents of an internally displaced persons camp); Prosecutor v. Thomas
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on a case-by-case basis in terms of the consequences that result from
specific acts.118
Ad hoc tribunal interpretations of “great harm and suffering” offer
additional guidance. Although undefined in the ICTY Statute, the
Trial Chamber repeatedly has held that “bodily harm” refers to harm
that “seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any
serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses.”119 Even
though “harm” need not be permanent or irremediable, it must result
in “grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a
normal and constructive life.”120 With respect to psychological harms
specifically, the harm-inflicting act must affect mental facilities in
more than a minor or temporary manner.121
The characterization of “serious” bodily and mental harm in
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević is particularly illustrative.122
Concluding that the trauma and wounds suffered by those who
managed to survive mass executions constituted “serious bodily and
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-04/01-06, Observations on Issues Concerning
Reparations, ¶¶ 36–37 (Aug. 7, 2012) (finding that child conscription resulted in
psychological harm from forcing children to quit school, separating children from
their families, and requiring children to participate in hostilities that included the
“very real” risk of serious injury or death); see also Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda
Abakaer Nourain & Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09,
Observations by the Legal Representatives for Victims a/1646/10 and a/1647/10,
¶¶ 4–9 (Aug. 8, 2011) (noting that victims sought redress for the “harm and
suffering” endured as a result of an attack on the AMIS base).
118. See Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶ 449 (affirming the fact-based standard for assessing harm and suffering)
(internal citation omitted); see also Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, Case No. 1T98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 165 (Feb. 25, 2004) (“[C]onsideration must be given to all
of the factual circumstances . . . [including] the nature of the act or omission, the
context in which it occurred, the personal circumstances of the victim including
age, sex and health, as well as the physical, mental and moral effects of the act
upon the victim.”).
119. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević & Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzidana,
Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 109 (May 21, 1999).
120. Kayishema & Ruzidana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 108 (citing Akayesu
(citation omitted)); Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment,
¶ 513 (Aug. 2, 2001).
121. See, e.g., Kayishema & Ruzidana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 110–13
(holding that “‘causing serious mental harm’ should be interpreted on a case-bycase basis in light of the relevant jurisprudence”).
122. Blagojević & Jokić, IT-02-60-T, Judgment.
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mental harm,” the Trial Chamber found that “[t]he fear of being
captured, and, at the moment of the separation, the sense of utter
helplessness and extreme fear for their family and friends’ safety as
well as for their own safety, is a traumatic experience from which
one will not quickly—if ever—recover.”123 Additionally, the Trial
Chamber held that the trauma associated with the forced
displacement of women, children, and elderly reached the requisite
level of “serious mental harm” in the circumstances of the case.124
Based on the relevant jurisprudence, “great suffering” thus
encompasses a wide range of injuries which need not be the
immediate consequence of specific actions. Although “great
suffering” can result from actions including assault, death threats,
and other forms of immediate psychological trauma, systemic state
actions that result in collective harms to a population may also cause
“great suffering.”125
Although the determination as to whether the impact of specific
acts falls under Article 7 requires a fact-specific inquiry, tangible
consequences of grand corruption at a general level must also be
considered.126 Available empirical data overwhelmingly indicates
that corruption negatively impacts poverty levels and inequality.127
123. See id. ¶ 647 (explaining that men were stripped of their identification
documents and taken to mass grave execution sites, ultimately resulting in the
“mental anguish of lying still, in fear, under the bodies—sometimes of relative or
friends—for long hours, listening to the sounds of the executions, of the moans of
those suffering in pain, and then of the machines as mass graves were dug”).
124. Id. ¶¶ 650–54 (finding that the displacement of Bosnian Muslims resulted
in traumatic suffering as a result of being forced to abandon their property and
being prevented from ever returning to their homes).
125. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7 (1) (criminalizing systemic conduct
that causes collective harm); Starr, supra note 10, at 1300–01 (advancing that
crimes against humanity can be “committed over time through imposition of living
conditions that make life unsustainable”).
126. See, e.g., Bantekas, supra note 16, at 446, 475 n.49 (noting that empirical
data on corruption is particularly illustrative; for example, widespread corruption
has been acknowledged as one of the most significant causes of the 2002 drought
that swept Malawi); Starr, supra note 10, at 1283–84 (illustrating how restricting
the amount of money used for the public good entrenches poverty and ultimately
leads to the loss of life); cf. KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 127 (2001) (noting that crimes which occur over long periods of
time such as “pillage, plunder, arbitrary destruction or expropriation of public and
private property” can still cause “great suffering, or serious injury”).
127. Gupta et al., supra note 28 (concluding that increases by one standard

2014]

CRIMINALIZING KLEPTOCRACY?

655

The oft-cited study by Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa
Alsonso-Terme finds that corruption has significant distributional
consequences by affecting budgetary revenues and expenditures.128
More generally, other studies articulate a direct connection between
grand corruption and indicators of humanitarian crisis, including:
falling life expectancy rates; rising child poverty; increases in
violence; and the deterioration of essential education and healthcare
infrastructure.129
Since empirical evidence demonstrates the severe consequences of
grand corruption, these humanitarian consequences must be
examined to determine whether they are sufficiently similar to the
injuries associated with the enumerated crimes in Article 7(1).
Relevant case law indicates that the nature of the facts, and the
physical, mental, and moral effects on the victims must be assessed
for a similarity determination.130 Under this rubric, the impact of
grand corruption appears comparable to the enumerated crimes in
Article 7. For example, much like murder and the extermination of

deviation increases the Gini coefficient of income inequality by 11% and income
growth of the poor by 5% annually).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Jacqueline Coolidge & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Kleptocracy and
Reform in African Regimes: Theory and Examples, in CORRUPTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICAN: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 71–74
(Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikulo eds., 2000) (examining how
widespread corruption led to humanitarian crisis in Somalia); Omar Azfar &
Tugrul Gurgur, Does Corruption Affect Health Outcomes in the Philippines?, 9
ECON. GOV. 197 (2008) (finding that corruption disproportionately negatively
affects health indicators of the poor); Utstein Anti-Corruption Research Centre,
Corruption in the Health Sector, U4 ISSUE 2006, available at
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2560-corruption-in-the-health-sector.pdf
(establishing that corruption reduces the resources available for health, lowers the
quality and effectiveness of healthcare services, and increases the cost of provided
services); Eboe-Osuji, supra note 16, at 123 (concluding that grand corruption
“affords both motive and opportunity to violate human rights violently”); Some
Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its
Impact on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH passim (Jan. 2004) (describing
consequences of the over $4 billion loss to corruption on poverty and life
expectancy in Angola).
130. See Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević & Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60T, Judgment, ¶ 627 (Jan. 17, 2005) (“The element of ‘similar seriousness’ is to be
evaluated in light of all factual circumstances, such as the nature of the act or
omission, the context within which it occurred, the individual circumstances of the
victim(s) as well as the physical, mental and moral effects on the victim(s).”).
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populations, grand corruption perpetuates lower life expectancy rates
among its collateral victims.131 Grand corruption can also inflict
severe deprivation, impacting the fundamental necessities of life in a
manner comparable to deportation, forcible transfer, and economic
persecution.132 Further, as in the case of apartheid, rule by
kleptocracy will inevitably involve systematic oppression of a
segment of the population to benefit the ruling class.133 Accordingly,
Article 7 has both the substantive and temporal breadth to encompass
the perpetration of grand corruption, which occurs on an ongoing
systemic basis and inflicts long-term consequences.134
Although individual violations of Article 7 would have to be
determined on a case-by-case basis, as a general principle, grand
corruption meets the Article 7(1)(k) requirements for great harm and
suffering. As such, if the particular consequences resulting from the
perpetration of grand corruption are sufficiently severe, they will
fulfill the actus reus of Article 7(1)(k).
3. The Consequences of Grand Corruption Are Intentional
Under Article 7(1)(k), the requisite mens rea for “other inhumane
acts” is intent.135 Following Article 30 of the Rome Statute, “intent”
exists only when an actor “means to engage in the conduct” or
“means to cause a consequence or is aware that it will occur in the
ordinary course of events.”136 The ICC Elements of Crimes
addressing Article 7(1)(k) provides further elaboration, requiring that
the perpetrator is “aware of the factual circumstances that establish
the character of the act.”137
Despite some disagreement, many scholars recognize that the
cumulative effect of these provisions extends mens rea beyond the
specific intent to bring about a particular consequence to include all
consequences that would occur in the ordinary course of events. 138
131. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7; see also Starr, supra note 10, at 1282–
86, 1301 (commenting on the devastating impact of grand corruption).
132. Starr, supra note 10, at 1301.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 30.
136. Id. art. 30(2).
137. Id. Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(k).
138. Compare Starr, supra note 10, at 1302–03, and ANTONIO CASSESE,
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As such, if the consequences of grand corruption are predictable, the
Rome Statute would allow tribunals to draw inferences based on the
circumstances regarding the perpetrator’s mental state, i.e., the
intention behind the underlying corrupt act.139
Article 25 addresses the issue of remoteness between actus reus
and mens rea by providing that public officials will be liable when
they intend to oversee the chain of command but do not personally
carry out prohibited acts.140 Under Article 25, intending to play an
“essential role in the implementation of a common plan” and having
awareness of the centrality of that role suffices to create criminal
culpability.141 Liability in these situations extends to arrangements
where none of the participants have total control over the entire
offense, but rely on one another for different parts of its
commission.142 This form of liability is particularly relevant for highINTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 165–66, 176 (“[R]ecklessness (dolus eventualis)
may be held to be contemplated in the definition laid down in paragraph 2.”), and
Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 108 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (advancing that Article
7(1)(k) language that requires awareness of the “factual circumstances that
established the character of the act” incorporates Article 30 standards into the
provision), with SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 475–76 (arguing that the “ordinary
course of events” standard is higher than recklessness and must be assessed in
terms of whether the consequence to the act in question was certain or nearcertain).
139. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 352–69 (June 15,
2009) (defining and applying “intent” under Article 30); see also Georges
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A,
Judgment, ¶ 63 (May 26, 2003) (noting that intent can be inferred from evidence
that demonstrates a consistent pattern of conduct); Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić
et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 820 (Jan. 14, 2000) (finding that acting
pursuant to a common plan can indicate intent).
140. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 25(3)(a); see also Prosecutor v. Alfred
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Jan. 27, 2000) (concluding
that complicity in aiding, abetting, or instigating a crime suffices to meet the mens
rea requirement, even if specific intent to commit the crime is absent).
141. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 25(3). See generally SCHABAS, supra
note 51, at 429 (2010) (citing instances of Article 25(3) application).
142. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Judgment, ¶¶ 342, 346–48 (Mar. 14, 2012) (finding that liability extended where
control over the commission of the prohibited act is shared); Gombo, ICC-01/0501-08, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 350 (advancing that under the
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ranking government officials who carry out prohibited acts by way of
their subordinates.143 Accordingly, Article 25 prevents government
officials who perpetrate systematic crimes from using their political
offices to obfuscate the mens rea requirements of the Rome Statute.
In sum, under the Rome Statute, the cumulative effect of these
standards creates liability for those who govern with the predictable
effect of inflicting significant harm and suffering against their
civilian populations.144 With regard to the perpetration of grand
corruption, one can infer intention from the relationship between
gravity of the corrupt act and the vulnerability of the population.145 If
a population is sufficiently impoverished or vulnerable to contracting
disease, for instance, and the diversion of funds is sufficiently large
in relation to the resources available to serve the needs of that
population, under ordinary circumstances that diversion would prove
significantly harmful.146 These consequences would seem clearly
apparent to high-ranking officials who govern by way of corruption
over an extended period of time. Although those officials may not
know of the specific individuals impacted by their corruption, the
systemic consequences would be apparent.147
concept of co-perpetration, two objective factors must exist: “(i) the suspect must
be part of a common plan or agreement with one or more persons; and (ii) the
suspect and the other co-perpetrator must carry out essential contribution in a
coordinated manner which result in the fulfillment of the material element of the
crime”).
143. Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 25(3)(a); Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶¶ 342, 346-48 (Mar. 14,
2012); Gombo, ICC-01/05-01-08, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 390
(establishing the scope of liability for co-perpetration, which directly implicates
high-level government officials).
144. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1303 (advancing that the consequences of
grand corruption would inevitably be apparent to its perpetrators); see also
Bantekas, supra note 16, at 474–75 (arguing that Article 30 can be used to hold
members of governments responsible for placing their people in a condition of life,
“which in the ordinary course of events would deprive them of access to sufficient
food and medical care”).
145. Starr, supra note 10, at 1303.
146. Cf. Bamidele et al., supra note 54, at 15–16 (finding empirical support for
the proposition that corruption impedes Nigeria’s poverty reduction efforts). See
generally Gupta et al., supra note 28, passim (articulating the connection between
poverty and corruption).
147. See Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A,
Judgment, ¶ 41 (July 7, 2006) (noting the breadth of intent); Starr, supra note 10,
at 1303 (providing an example of an accused who tells others to rape Tutsi
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B. PETER ODILI’S TENURE AS GOVERNOR OF RIVERS STATE
PRESENTS A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF GRAND CORRUPTION THAT
VIOLATES ARTICLE 7(1)(K) OF THE ROME STATUTE
In the abstract, the application of Article 7 in the relevant case law
indicates that the perpetration of grand corruption constitutes a crime
against humanity under the Rome Statute. Accordingly, this
subsection considers the specific application of Article 7(1)(k) to
Peter Odili’s tenure as governor of Nigeria’s Rivers State. In this
regard, it assesses the prospective liability of Governor Odili and
suggests a potential path for ICC action.
1. Odili Perpetrated Grand Corruption During His Tenure as
Governor of Rivers State
As noted above, grand corruption involves high-level public
officials who commit widespread abuse of power for private gains at
the expense of the public.148 Under this definition, Odili’s direct role
in perpetrating economic and electoral corruption establishes the
commission of grand corruption during his tenure as governor. 149 In
effect, the evidence demonstrates that Odili effectively governed by
way of kleptocracy.
With regard to economic corruption, the evidence implicates Odili
for his direct involvement in orchestrating widespread budgetary
diversions and the siphoning of government funds from the Rivers
State treasury.150 Specifically, his relationship to the Rockson
Engineering Company resulted in the establishment of dummy
corporations, awarding of fictitious contacts, and channeling of
billions of Naira into various unidentified bank accounts.151
women—the accused will not know the individual victims, but will still be liable
for instigating rape; “the relevant factual circumstances are those giving this
conduct its devastating impact—the extremely poor population, pervasive threats
of preventable disease, the cash-strapped government, and so forth. The mental
state element is satisfied . . . if the perpetrator is aware of those facts—as a head of
state surely would be”).
148. See discussion supra Part II.A (defining grand corruption).
149. See discussion supra Part II.C (outlining the breadth of Odili’s corruption).
150. See EFCC REPORT, supra note 62 (implicating Odili for siphoning money
out of the Rivers State treasury); Draft Charges, supra note 63 (confirming these
allegations); Chop Fine, supra note 56, 75–78 (outlining budgetary malfeasance in
Rivers State).
151. EFCC REPORT, supra note 62.
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Similarly, Odili’s documented use of State power to perpetrate
widespread electoral corruption is also indicative of grand
corruption. His willingness to inflict widespread violence against his
political opponents and his use of government personnel and gang
leaders for his political benefit helped him to solidify power in the
2003 election; it also amounted to a significant abuse of power.152
Accordingly, under the Odili regime, the gravity and scope of
corruption perpetrated against the people of Rivers State provides a
compelling case for violations of Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.
Focusing on the contextual chapeau elements of Article 7(1) and the
actus reus and mens rea elements of Article 7(1)(k), the following
subsections assess the grand corruption under the Odili regime in the
context of the Rome Statute.
2. Odili’s Perpetration of Grand Corruption Meets the Contextual
Requirements for Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity
Odili’s perpetration of grand corruption meets the chapeau
requirements of Article 7(1).153 His abuse of public office, including
his looting of the public treasury and his coordination of widespread
electoral fraud, became the de facto policy of the Rivers State
government.154 Moreover, even if these actions were informal and/or
unauthorized under Nigerian law, Article 7(2) jurisprudence
indicates that they would still constitute State policies, and thus
satisfy the “attack” requirement of Article 7(1).155
Likewise, corruption under Odili was both widespread and
systematic.156 Looting the public coffers of ₦100 billion impacted a
wide segment of the population.157 Additionally, Odili perpetrated
152. See, e.g., Nigeria’s 2003 Election, supra note 81, at 14–19 (outlining
violence in the 2003 election).
153. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art 7(1).
154. See discussion supra Part II.C.
155. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶
653 (May 7, 1997) (observing that the notion of an “attack” is broad); Prosecutor
v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 204–05 (Mar. 2, 2000)
(arriving at a similar conclusion).
156. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1); see Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case
No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 93–97 (June 12, 2002) (defining
“widespread” and “systematic”).
157. Cf. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges

2014]

CRIMINALIZING KLEPTOCRACY?

661

electoral corruption in a systematic, organized, and deliberate
manner to solidify his power throughout the State.158 As these
“attacks” and their consequences were neither isolated nor random,
they were widespread and systematic.159
Governor Odili also would have known of the broader context of
his “attacks” against the people of Rivers State.160 Given that Odili
occupied the highest office in the state and would have overseen all
government appropriations, he would have been aware of the scale
and scope of abuses associated with the Rivers State budget.161 The
same can be said of Odili’s role in the perpetration of electoral
corruption, which he engineered to his political benefit.162 Finally,
one may infer Odili’s level of awareness because his actions resulted
in predictable consequences, which he either intended or ought to
have known would follow.163 This point is expanded upon below.
3. Odili’s Perpetration of Grand Corruption Caused Great Suffering
and Serious Injury
As noted above, the actus reus element of Article 7(1)(k) is
contingent on the extent of the harm and suffering that results from
attacks against civilian populations.164 Application of the Rome
Statute also clarifies that “suffering” and “injury” are to be
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 116–24 (June 15, 2009)
(finding repeated similar attacks that occurred in a large geographic area
“widespread”).
158. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art 7(1); see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 271 (July 15, 1999) (elaborating on the
“widespread or systematic” requirement).
159. Cf. Kunarac, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 93–97 (adopting the
definitions of “widespread” and “systematic” set out in Tadic).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1); see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema
& Ruzidana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 133–34 (May 21, 1999) (noting
that the accused must have actual or constructive knowledge about the broader
context of his act).
161. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1); Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 79–80
(noting that Odili would have had final say on all budgetary appropriations).
162. See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, supra note 81, at 14–19
(documenting Odili’s ties to gang leaders).
163. See Gupta et al., supra note 28, passim (finding causation between
corruption and poverty); Bamidele et al., supra note 54, at 15–16 (linking
corruption and underdevelopment in Nigeria).
164. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (defining the actus reus of Article
7(1)(k)).
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interpreted broadly, can occur over extended periods of time, and can
be directed against a general population.165 As a result, specific
corrupt acts do not need to be connected to the harms of specific
individuals; instead, if corruption creates a harm or injury to the
general population sufficiently comparable to the harm or injury
from the enumerated crimes in Article 7, the actus reus will be
satisfied.166
Under the Odili regime, grand corruption exacerbated poverty,
deterred investment, and threatened the physical and psychological
security of the citizens of Rivers State.167 Economic corruption
associated with the Rivers State budget significantly diminished the
available money for essential social services.168 While Odili and his
allies accrued considerable benefits from widespread corruption, the
Rivers State government failed to make more than nominal
investments in healthcare and education, despite the availability of
funds due to the significant influx of oil revenue.169 Certainly, these
deprivations would have negatively impacted the citizens of the
State.
Socio-economic data from Rivers State illustrates the overall
vulnerability of much of the population and confirms the significant
consequences of corruption. For example, in 2005, 43.12% of the
population lived on one dollar or less per day.170 The Gini coefficient
was 0.4792, well below the national average of 0.488.171 Moreover,
165. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
166. See id.
167. Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 75–88; see Nigeria: Corruption and Misuse
Rob Nigerians of Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/01/31/nigeria-corruption-and-misuse-robnigerians-rights (arriving at the same conclusion).
168. See Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 77–78 (noting that in 2006, budgetary
expenditures for transport, dining, and other extravagances constituted seventeen
percent of total state government spending, amounting to more than ₦30.1 billion
($230 million)—more than the annual allocation given to many Nigerian states).
169. See id. at 89–90 (explaining that because funds were diverted instead of
applied to improving health and education, many Rivers State citizens were denied
some of their most basic human rights); Hassan Tai Ejibunu, Nigeria’s Niger Delta
Crisis: Root Causes of Peacelessness, 7 EPU RESEARCH PAPERS 22 (2007),
available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/6730590/nigerias-nigerdelta-crisis-root-causes-of-peacelessness-european- (reiterating the extravagant
expenses in the 2006 budget).
170. Nigeria 2008-2009, supra note 60, at 150.
171. See Bamidele et al., supra note 54, at 15–16 (concluding the same with
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United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) data from 2009
discloses that Rivers State had an unemployment rate of 27.9%,
dwarfing the national average of 19.7%.172 The same data also
conclusively indicates that although Rivers State has a relatively high
GDP ($5,210.69), it has a pronounced disparity in wealth and
entrenched poverty.173 Moreover, in 2008, the life expectancy rate in
Rivers State (forty-four years for males and forty-six years for
females) further supports the conclusion that lagging socio-economic
development resulted in significant harm and suffering to the
population.174
On its face, the situation in Rivers State is consistent with the
research that concludes that corruption increases poverty and
inequality, and decreases social spending and economic growth.175 In
light of the causal relationship between corruption and
underdevelopment, it logically follows that Odili’s abuse of the
budgetary process and outright theft of Rivers State funds would
have significantly contributed to negative socio-economic
conditions.176 As such, Odili’s actions should be regarded as creating
significant harm and suffering to the citizenry.177
Odili’s documented perpetration of widespread electoral fraud also

respect to Nigeria, specifically). Compare id. at 148 (noting statistics that depict
the high poverty level in Rivers State), with Gupta et al., supra note 28, at 38–40
(concluding that corruption increases of one standard deviation increase the Gini
coefficient of income inequality by about eleven points and income growth of the
poor by about five percentage points per annum).
172. Social Statistics in Nigeria, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS 238 (2009),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53345549/Social-Statistics-in-Nigeria2009.
173. Nigeria 2008–2009, supra note 60, at 64–65.
174. Id. at 152.
175. See Gupta, supra note 28, at 38–40; Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong,
Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in Africa, 3 ECON. GOV.
183, 185–86 (2002) (concluding that (1) a one point increase in corruption
decreases the growth rates of GDP by between 0.75 and 0.9 percent per year and of
per capita income growth rate by between 0.39 and 0.41 percent per year,
respectively; and (2) a one point increase in the corruption index is tied to a seven
point increase in the Gini coefficient).
176. See Gupta, supra note 28, at 38–40.
177. See Ejibunu, supra note 169, at 22 (noting that as of 2007, 80% of
companies had stopped their operations in Rivers State, which in turn increased
youth unemployment and exacerbated societal discontent and violence).
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significantly harmed the citizens of Rivers State.178 Directly, Odili
used State power to direct violence against his political opponents
during the 2003 election.179 In addition to hiring gangs to carry out
acts of violence against political opponents,180 he also relied on locallevel chairmen181 and police forces to further his political interests
throughout the state.182 Commenting on the 2003 electoral period,
one civil society group referred to it as a “low-intensity armed
struggle.”183
In addition to the immediate violence, widespread electoral
corruption harmed the Rivers State population over the longer term.
It rendered political officeholders unaccountable to their constituents
and undermined the responsiveness of government institutions to the
population’s needs.184 As a result, by allowing public officials to
govern without the risk of being voted out of office, electoral fraud
exacerbated corruption in Rivers State, which, as noted above,
ultimately harmed the citizenry.185
The perpetration of grand corruption in Rivers State satisfies the
requirement for “great harm and suffering” under Article 7(1)(k).
Substantively, the above-noted consequences of grand corruption
correspond with the requisite level of severity established in the
jurisprudence—the consequences were severe, and inflicted
178. See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, supra note 81, at 14–19 (outlining
the corruption and violence that underpinned the 2003 Rivers State elections).
179. Id.
180. See Criminal Politics, supra note 82, at 36 (reporting explicit evidence of
Odili contracting with gang leaders to disrupt the election in his favor).
181. See Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 33–34 (finding that state-level politicians
expected the local chairmen to “make returns” on their stolen government funds by
mobilizing violence and manipulating election results in their constituencies).
182. See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, supra note 81, 14–15 (citing HRW
interview, Port Harcourt, July 14, 2003, which revealed that that police played an
active role in supporting the PDP).
183. Criminal Politics, supra note 82, at 80–81 (citing an election monitoring
report from Apr. 26, 2003).
184. See Suberu, supra note 81, at 459, 469–71 (2010) (finding that, over the
long-term, electoral corruption impedes development and creates unresponsive
institutions, an over-centralization of power, a near-monolithic party system, and
ethno-regional conflict).
185. See Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 100–01 (“Nigeria’s federal government
has allowed the perpetuation of a political system that often rewards politicians
who use their ill-gotten gains to mobilize violence in support of their political
ambitions. In doing so, it undermined its own efforts to fight corruption.”).
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widespread physical and psychological damage to the citizenry. 186
Further, since “harm and suffering” includes the direct and indirect
consequences of specific acts, both the short-term consequences
(deprivation of essential social services and the infliction of
violence) and the long-term consequences (poverty and
accountability deficit) of corruption in Rivers State satisfy this
element.187
4. Odili’s Perpetration of Grand Corruption Was Intentional
Under Article 7(1)(k), the consequences of “other inhumane acts”
acts must be intentional.188 Article 30 of the Rome Statute, however,
elaborates that intention can be constructive, based on the
consequences that would ordinarily occur from specific actions. 189
Accordingly, to determine whether Odili perpetrated grand
corruption intentionally, the appropriate question is whether he
governed with the predictable effect of inflicting harm and suffering
against the population of Rivers State.
Based on the gravity of his acts and centralization of power in the
Governor’s Office, Odili would have needed either actual or
constructive intent to bring about the consequences of his actions.190
The consequences of Odili’s looting of the public treasury were
predictable.191 The monopoly on power that Odili claimed in the
governor’s office gave him discretionary authority over all public

186. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 449 (Sept. 30, 2008) (charging the perpetrators
of non-fatal violent attacks); Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević & Dragan Jokić,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 623–32 (Jan. 17, 2005) (finding forcible
transfer constituted an “other inhumane act”); Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, Case
No. 1T-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 166 (Feb. 25, 2004) (holding that witnessing and
surviving mass execution resulted in serious mental harm); Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-04/01-06, Observations on Issues Concerning
Reparations, ¶¶ 36–37 (Aug. 7, 2012) (noting the psychological harm resulting
from child conscription).
187. See Gupta, supra note 28, at 38–40; Gyimah-Brempong, supra note 175, at
183, 185–86 (analyzing the empirical consequences of corruption).
188. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (defining the mens rea of Article
7(1)(k)).
189. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 30.
190. See id. art. 25 (creating liability for jointly-committed offenses).
191. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 (outlining Odili’s budgetary corruption).
See generally Gupta et al., supra note 28; Gyimah-Brempong, supra note 175.
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expenditures, including decisions to neglect government agencies in
need.192 Accordingly, the Governor would have consciously decided
to siphon public funds into dummy corporations and financially
starve social service infrastructure.193 As a result, if the harm that
followed from these actions was not specifically intended, at a
minimum it would have been predictable to Odili.194 This is
especially clear with regard to the socio-economic vulnerability of
the Rivers State population, which also would have been apparent to
the Governor.195 The fact that Odili materially benefited from using
the Rivers State Budget as a slush fund for his private gains further
highlights the obvious consequences of budgetary corruption as Odili
directly benefitted at the expense of the public.196
Similarly, Odili’s orchestration of electoral fraud is viewed as
intentional. The above-noted evidence documents his abuse of
government power to manipulate the 2003 election results—
particularly, the hiring of gangs to carry out violent attacks against
political opponents.197 When considering the testimony from Ateke
Tom, Odili’s stark intentionality behind the 2003 attacks directly
implicates him for sponsoring violent activity to eliminate his
political enemies.198
192. See Chop Fine, supra note 56, at 79 (“Political and economic power in
Rivers State rests overwhelmingly in the hands of its governor. This basic fact is
starkly reflected in the enormous proportion of state revenues available to the
governor to spend at his discretion, and in the financial neglect accorded to other
government agencies.”).
193. Id.
194. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1303 (advancing the predictability standard);
see also Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 130 (June 15, 2009)
(noting intent can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances).
195. See UN Quality of Life Index: Nigeria Placed 156, VANGUARD, Nov. 2,
2011,
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/un-quality-of-life-index-nigeriaplaced-156/ (ranking Nigeria 156 out of 187 countries with comparable data on the
International Human Development Indicators with an average life expectancy of
51.9 years and average income of roughly $2000 per year); cf. Gupta et al., supra
note 28, at 38–40; Gyimah-Brempong, supra note 175, at 183, 185–86 (explaining
that corruption causes these consequences).
196. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 (outlining scale of financial corruption in
Rivers State).
197. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (noting Odili’s role in perpetrating
electoral corruption).
198. Criminal Politics, supra note 82, at 81.
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The longer-term consequences of electoral corruption were also
predictable. Inherently, the massive electoral fraud in 2003 resulted
in the undemocratic election of government officials who were
largely unaccountable to their constituents.199 Additionally, failing to
fulfill his post-election promises to pay and employ youth gangs had
the inevitable consequence of creating significant violent backlash
and further deterioration of social cohesion.200 Commenting on the
broader consequences of the 2003 elections, Patrick Naagbanton,
Port Harcourt journalist and activist, remarked:
They buy guns for our youths; destroy our schools and our amenities, and
our communities. They ask our youths to kill one another and do others of
their biddings . . . . Most of these youths that the state had turned into
cultists, hostage-takers, armed robbers, assassins, prostitutes and thugs
would have been great and meaningful to this society, but today their
future is rocked with violence and evil. 201

While these consequences may not have been intended, surely
they were predictable to those orchestrating the violence, including
Governor Odili.
As grand corruption under the Odili regime satisfies the contextual
(chapeau), actus reus, and mens rea elements of Article 7(1)(k), a
strong case exists for ICC prosecution of Governor Odili for having
committed crimes against humanity. Moreover, given the Nigerian
judiciary’s unwillingness to hold Odili accountable for stealing
public money and abusing the powers of his office, the ICC provides
a viable alternative to domestic prosecution.202 Accordingly, with the
need and legal availability for ICC investigation and prosecution of
grand corruption in mind, the following section highlights two
central recommendations for incorporating anti-corruption initiatives
into the ICC’s mandate.
199. See Suberu, supra note 81, at 459, 469–71 (advancing that the systemic
problems of River State are tied to financial and electoral corruption).
200. See generally Criminal Politics, supra note 82, 81–90 (exploring the
legacy of the 2003 Election in Rivers State).
201. Id. at 80.
202. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (outlining the accountability deficit in
Rivers State); see also EFCC REPORT, supra note 62; Draft Charges, supra note
63 (implicating Odili for heinous corruption); cf. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art.
17 (limiting the ICC jurisdiction to situations where host states are unwilling or
unable to investigate and/or prosecute international crimes).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Addressing the prevalence of corruption in the developing world
ultimately requires a multifaceted solution, involving both domestic
and international legal tools. Given the significant barriers to the
amendment of the Rome Statute, and the unwillingness of certain
countries to consent to the ICC’s jurisdiction, this comment argues
that the existing ICC framework already provides a working
foundation to prosecute egregious cases of grand corruption.203
Unlike most international anti-corruption treaties, the Rome Statute
empowers the ICC with the functional tools necessary for the
prosecution of grand corruption.204 The ICC has broad investigatory
powers to collect information about international crimes.205 Further,
upon conviction, the ICC also has the authority to compel states to
forfeit assets derived directly or indirectly from those crimes.206
Therefore, not only would the ICC create international criminal
accountability for those who perpetrate grand corruption, it would
provide an opportunity for the return of the proceeds of corruption.
Working within the current legal framework, the following
recommendations would bolster ICC prosecution of grand
corruption. First, the ICC should amend the Regulations of the Office
of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) to include prosecutorial discretion
guidelines that focus on egregious international crimes that occur on
systemic basis, beyond those crimes typically prosecuted as a result
of armed conflict and mass atrocity. Second, in conjunction with the
UN, the ICC should support the formation of an Anti-Corruption
Advisory Board, which would conduct hearings concerning
egregious corruption and make formal recommendations to the OTP.

203. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1297, 1305–06 (noting both the barriers to
amending the Rome Statute and the ICC’s limits with respect to non-party states).
204. See Webb, supra note 2, at 193–204, 218–22 (outlining the absence of
functional enforcement mechanisms in the current international anti-corruption
regime).
205. Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 5(1), 54–56.
206. Id. arts. 77, 79.
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A. THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR SHOULD AMEND ITS
GOVERNING REGULATIONS TO PROVIDE FOR PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION GUIDELINES THAT TARGET SYSTEMIC CRIMES
As prosecutorial discretion is a central feature of the OTP,
questions arise pertaining to the transparency of the situation and
case selection process, and whether it sufficiently considers all of the
most egregious international crimes.207 For example, the 2009–2012
Prosecutorial Strategy sets out a vague mandate that limits OTP
investigation and prosecution to top-level government officials who
perpetrate crimes that are sufficiently grave with respect to the
crimes’ scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact.208 The
decision-making process based on these criteria, however, has
resulted in the OTP focusing narrowly on crimes that are perpetrated
during “crises”—i.e., armed conflict or mass atrocities.209
Accordingly, systemic crimes that occur outside of immediate
“crises” have been largely ignored, despite their express enumeration
in the Rome Statute.210 The ICC has neglected these crimes, even
though they arguably have created more long-term harm and
suffering than some of the crimes that the ICC has investigated and
prosecuted.211
To address this functional limitation, the OTP should amend its
Prosecutorial Strategy to expressly account for non-“crisis” crimes,
including those unenumerated crimes such as grand corruption.212 In
doing so, the OTP would effectively widen its mandate and create
207. International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor,
reg. 13, ICC Doc. BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 29, 2009) (“[T]he Prosecutor shall ensure
that the Office and its members maintain their full independence and do not seek or
act on instructions from any external source.”).
208. Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR ¶¶
18–21 (Feb. 1 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-36504514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf.
209. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1312–13 (recognizing that although crisislinked prosecution of crimes against humanity have been the norm, the Rome
Statute creates legal and political space for which systemic crimes could be
prosecuted outside of the crisis context).
210. Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 7(1).
211. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (arguing that grand corruption creates
significant harm and suffering).
212. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1276–77 (noting this deficiency and arguing
that selection should be based on the degree of suffering and the Court’s
institutional capacity to reduce such suffering).

670

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:3

further international awareness of the prosecutorial reach of the ICC.
This type of amendment could also work to increase ICC
transparency through an adoption of more precise guidelines for OTP
selection of situations and cases for formal investigation and
prosecution.213

B. THE ICC SHOULD SUPPORT THE FORMATION OF AN
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ADVISORY BOARD TO
CONDUCT HEARINGS ON GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND MAKE
FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OTP
In conjunction with the UNODC, the ICC should support the
formation of an Anti-Corruption Advisory Board to solicit evidence
and conduct hearings with respect to the perpetration of corruption
by high-level government officials.214 In doing so, the Advisory
Board would seek evidence from a broad array of domestic and
international civil society groups, citizenry, and former government
officials. The Advisory Board would make preliminary assessments
as to the veracity of corruption-related complaints and also function
as an information repository for ongoing situations in conjunction
with existing international anti-corruption organizations.
In the event that the Advisory Board is presented with compelling
evidence of egregious government corruption, it would make public
recommendations for the punishment of corrupt officials under
domestic law. Working with the Conference of the States Parties to
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Advisory
Board would attempt to induce domestic prosecution of the
implicated government officials.215 If the implicated state failed to
comply, however, the Advisory Board would then make formal
recommendations to the OTP to conduct an official investigation of
the alleged corruption. These recommendations would mirror U.N.

213. Kai Ambos & Ignaz Stegmiller, Prosecuting International Crimes at the
International Criminal Court: Is There a Coherent and Comprehensive
Prosecution Strategy?, 58 CRIME LAW SOC. CHANGE 391, 392, 409–10
(advocating that the OTP should clarify its prosecutorial guidelines for further
coherence and transparency in the situation case and selection process).
214. See Harms, supra note 16, 199–200 (making a similar recommendation
prior to the passage of UNCAC).
215. See UNCAC, supra note 13, art. 63 (establishing the Conference of the
State Parties to improve cooperation and capacity for UNCAC implementation).
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Security Council or State party referrals proscribed in Article 13 of
the Rome Statute.216 In so doing, the Advisory Board would support
the gradual incorporation of grand corruption into the ICC’s
prosecutorial strategy, which would be particularly crucial given the
lack of an international legal standard for prosecuting corruption.217

V. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the Rome Statute, the ICC should exercise its
prosecutorial discretion to adopt an aggressive strategy to fight
egregious cases of grand corruption, particularly where government
leaders decimate domestic budgets or otherwise engage in gross
abuses of power that detrimentally affect the public. The legal
foundation for this proposition is strong: grand corruption constitutes
an “other inhumane act” under Article 7(1)(k); it also satisfies the
contextual requirements for crimes against humanity due to its scope,
widespread consequences, and underlying intentionality. As grand
corruption already falls under the purview of the Rome Statute, the
ICC has the authority, legitimacy, and functionality to fill the glaring
enforcement gap that currently plagues the international anticorruption regime. Ultimately, failing to address this problem will
allow high-level government officials like Peter Odili to maintain
impunity for the perpetration of grand corruption—a crime against
humanity—against their people.

216. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 13(a), (b). But see id. art. 53
(providing the Prosecutor final discretion to refuse to initiate a formal
investigation).
217. See Starr, supra note 10, at 1312 (noting that corruption has never been
prosecuted in the international criminal context).

